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500:1 
',sl:;'~ (L. A. No. 20878. In Bank. Nov. 110, 1949.] ... ~:l 
'') ;,: 
INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY COMPANY (8 Corporation)::' 
Petitioner, v. INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMIS8~' 
SION. HAZEL PAULINE SPIDLE et aI., Responden~; 
(1]] Workmen's Oompensation - W1I1'&Dce - Beformation.-Th., 
evidence authorized the Industrial Accident Commission ~;j 
reform an individual-insured compensation policy replacing:! 
a partncrship policy under which relatives of the partners ? 
were not excluded, so as to extend the same eoverage to the~' 
insured employer's relatives, where it appeared that the em . .:'. 
ployer intended to order a policy with full eoverage for all . 
his employees, and that there was to be a mere change in D&JDC! 
of the insured from a partnership to the employer as the 
succeeding individual owner. 
[2] Id.-Insurance-E1fect of Assignment of Bmpl07er's BusinesS. 
-Although a compensation insurance policy provided that , .. 
when the name of the insured was changed from a partnership .'{ 
to that of an individual succeeding partner, employees who . 
were relatives of the individual insured would be excluded if ..•.. 
not specially covered as such, yet Ins. Code, § 304, relating . 
to transfers by a partner, indicates that the "interest in the" 
[1) See 14 Oal.Jur. 454; 29 Am.Jur. 114. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Workmen's Compensation, § 253.1; 
[2,5J Workmen's Compensation, § 254; [3] Insurance, § 53; [4] 
Workmen's COlllpensation, § 255. 
/ 
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insurance" passes when one partner buys out the others, and 
that interest should embrace the character of the employees 
covered; hence the individual succeeding partner is entitled 
to assume that a mere change in the name of the insured from 
the partnership to him would not limit the protection he 
theretofore had, and intended to have in the new policy. 
(3) Insurance - Oontract - Beformation. - Where an insured re-
quests an existing but expiring policy to be renewed, no change 
may be made in the terms of the renewal policy without notice 
to the insured. 
('J Workmen'. Oompenaation- Iuurance-Bstoppel.-An illS1JJ'o 
ance company was not entitled to annulment of an award of 
the Industrial Accident Commission reforming and enforcing 
an individual-insured compensation policy which replaced a 
partnership policy covering all employees of the partnership, 
and under which a widow of a deceased son-in-law of the em-
ployer was allowed death benefits, although the new policy, 
like the old one, provided that if the policy was issued to an 
"individual" the individual's relatives were not covered, where 
the insurer should have anticipated that the insured, a former 
partner who bought out the other partner's interust in the 
partnership business, would believe that his relatives would 
not be excluded by such purchase, the insurance broker who 
collected the premiums was aware of the presence of the son-
in-law's name on the insured's payroll, the premiums were 
paid to and retained by the insurer, and the insurer did not 
deliver the individual policy until some time after the son-in-
law's fatal accident. 
[6] ld.-Insuranee-Ueet of Assignment of Bmpl07er's BuaiJleB8. 
-Under Ins. Code, § 304, a partnership compensation policy 
which covered a partner's son-in-law employed by the firm 
continued the coverage and rendered it effective on behalf 
of such partner, even after such partner had bought out the 
other partner's interest, where the policy had not expired and 
had not been terminated by the parties at the time of the 
eon-in-law's death. 
PROCEEDING to review an order of the Industrial Acci-
dent Commission awarding compensation for death. Award 
affirmed. 
Herlihy & Herlihy and E. Hubert Herlihy for Petitioner. 
T. Groezinger and John A. Rowe, Jr., for Respondents. 
i 
CARTER, J.-Petitioner, insurance company, seeks an an-: 
Dulment of an award of respondent commission reforming and,' 
I 
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enforcing as reformed a workmen's compensation ;na·" .... ,ft 
policy, whereby the widow of the deceased workman,a . 
tive of the employer, was allowed death benefits. 
Prior to August I, 1946, R. C. Cornish and Roland '. 
Schultz were ' partners in a business venture. A policy 
workmen's compensation insurance was issued to the nA'~n_~. 
ship and to the partners jointly but not severally, ruJnDllIlglI 
from January 22, 1946, to January 22, 1947,covering all 
their employees. On the subject of whether relatives 
excluded, the policy provided that if a partner$hip was 
insured it would not include partners but nothing was 
as to relatives of the partners. With respect to relatives, 
provided that if the policy is issued to an "individual" 
such individual's relatives are not covered. Schultz, n .. " ... nn' ''' 
sold his interest in the business to Cornish in July, 1946, 
new policy was issued by the petitioner dated January 
1947, but covering the period August 1, 1946, to August 
1947, and presumably ' the partnership policy was .,.....'''.,1,.,'-&. 
The new policy ran to Cornish as an individual and the clauses 
with respect to relatives were the same as in the partnership 
policy. Thus it could be reasoned that as long as the insured 
was a partnership, the employees of the partnership would 
not be excluded even though related to one of the partners, . 
but when an individual was the insured, his relatives are ex-
cluded. This presents the question of the extent to which . 
the coverage was intended to be affected by the change of the 
insured from a partnership to Cornish alone, the individual, ' 
when the arrangement was made for the cancellation of the 
partnership policy to be replaced by an individual-insured . 
policy. That is to say, was it contemplated that the change 
from a partnership insured to an individual insured would 
affect only the name in which the policy was to stand, or was 
it to go farther and bring into operation the clauses that ex-
cluded relatives when the insured was an individual rather 
than a partnership t 
The circumstances surrounding the issuance of the above 
mentioned policies are as follows: The partnership was dis-
solved on August 1, 1946, and notices of such dissolution were 
sent to all persons with whom the partners had dealt, includ-
ing petitioner, and Clarence Haugen. Haugen was an insur-
ance broker who procured the partnership policy for the part-
nership. While in such capacity he was the agent for the 
partnership, and later, for Cornish in connection with the 
procurement of the insurance. There is evidence from which 
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it may be inferred that he was petitioner's agent for the col-
lection of premiums on policies inasmuch as the invoices or 
bills for premiums from petitioner stated that Cornish should 
pay the premiums to "your agent" Haugen. On October 23, 
1946, Mrs. Cornish, the wife of Cornish, who acted as his book-
keeper and who handled all his insurance matters, called on 
Haugen to make out payroll reports and see about the change 
of name resulting from the partnership dissolution. At that 
time, Spidle, Cornish'8 son-in-law, and his son, Arthur Cor-
nish, were employed by Cornish, and Haugen was aware of 
the relationship and employment. (There is a conflict on that 
subject but the evidence clearly establishes it.) The system of 
arranging for premiums in workmen's compensation insur-
ance contemplates a payment by the insured at the time the 
policy is ordered. Thereafter, at periodic intervals, sometimes 
monthly, the insured makes a payroll report to the insurer 
which shows his employees and compensation received. On 
the basis of these reports the premiuni is computed and a 
statement sent to the insured. There may be a credit in favor 
of either the insurer or insured depending upon the relation 
of the figures arrived at by the computation and the initial 
deposit. Haugen assisted in preparing the reports for August 
and September, 1946, and the premiums for those months 
were paid to Haugen. Spidle was listed by name on the pay-
roll and it may be inferred Haugen knew of the presence of 
his name thereon. Haugen, being doubtful as to how the 
change in the named insured should be accomplished, tele-
phoned petitioner's office and was advised by a Mr. Furbush 
that the partnership policy should be sent in for cancellation 
and the insurance would be rewritten to name Cornish alone 
as the insured and dated back to August I, 1946. 
In the Report of Referee (Report of Record) dated April 
22, 1947, we find this statement: "When the witness [Mrs. 
Cornish] left the broker's [Haugen's] office after having left 
with him for cancellation the old compensation and liability 
policy on the partnership, and arranging for the issuance of 
a new policy in their stead, the witness remarked to the broker 
in substance, 'I have nothing to show now that we are insured. 
are we fully covered" The broker replied in substance, 'Yes. 
you are fully covered. don't worry.' The broker had said that 
he would write a new policy as of Aug. 1. 1946. The broker 
hail been introduced to the neff'nnant's [Cornish's] SOD, 
Arthur, and the decedent as the defendant's son-in-law on 
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the Sunday in January when he first came to· their house in 
connection with writing the policy on the partnership." The 
petitioner stresses the theory that Mrs. Cornish intended to 
order exactly the same type of policy, with the exception of a 
change in name from a partnership to an individual insured. 
It appears quite obvious that the employer intended to order 
a policy naming him as individual insured with full covrrage 
for all his employees. Much importance is attached to the pro-
vision in the original policy declaring that certain relatives 
are excluded if the insured is an individual. This would 
seem to be most unimportant since that policy was issued to a 
partnership under the terms of which such relat1ves were not 
excluded. It would seem that what Mrs. Cornish intended to 
order was a policy extending the same coverage under a dif-
ferent name. 
Haugen, at the time Mrs. Cornish took in the old policy 
for cancellation, called Furbush, admittedly an agent of the 
defendant carrier, to ascertain the manner in which the 
matter should be handled. Petitioner states, in its briefs, 
that Haugen" may have been" its agent for collection of pre-
miums, and that Hangen "was its agent for collection," but 
it is denied that he was an agent for the purpose of effecting 
or extending coverage, yet it is admitted that the oral agree-
ment, made by Haugen with Mrs. Cornish, to the effect that 
the policy of insurance would be retroactive from August 1, 
1946, is valid. Haugen then sent a letter to petitioner in 
which he stated that the partnership policy should be can-
celed as of August 1, 1946, because of "change of entity" of 
the insured; that the policy should be "rewritten" effective 
August 1, 1946, naming Cornish as an individual, as insured; 
and that enclosed were checks, one for $29.75 for the balance 
of premium due on partnership policy, and one for $54.21, 
for premiums on the policy to be "rewritten" according to 
payroll report for August 1. 1946, to October 1, 1946. No 
word was heard from petitioner nnti! J annary 17th or 20th, 
1947, when the rewritten policy was finally received by Cor-
nish. This was after the accident occurred (Dec. 10, 1946) 
in which Spidle lost his life. After that accident, there being 
some doubt about the coverage of the policy, Haugen communi-
cated with petitioner, and, as a result, a rider appeared on the 
policy when finally received which specifically named Arthur 
Cornish as covered althongh a son of Cornish. Petitioner 
made no offer to return the preminm collected on a payroll 
with Spidle's name on it either before or after the accident. 
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[1] Petitioner contends that the evidence is insufficient to 
establish reformation. We believe that from all of thE' cir-
cumstances and the statutory law a ease is made for insuTs.nce 
coverage by petitioner. It is clear tbat the only thing sought 
to be achieved by Cornish waa the change in the name of the 
insured from a partnership to bim as the succeeding individual 
owner. Certainly he did not contemplate that the coverage 
of his policy was to be reduced by such change. He wanted 
just as fuU protection as be had before.' The change in name 
was a mere formality. The circumstances present a situation 
peculiarly within the spirit of the statutory law. Hln tbe case 
of partners, joint owners, or owners in common, who are 
jointly insured, a transfer of interest by one to another thereof 
does not avoid insurance, even thougb it· bas been agreed that 
the insurance shalJcease upon an alienation of the subject 
insured" (Ins. Code, § 804:), and the cases holding thereunder 
that an insurer is liable for an injury to the employee of an 
individual, wbo was formerly a partner in a partnership. cov-
ered by insurance, the business of wbich partnprsbip be has 
acquired and no change in name waa made after the dil!80-
lution of the partnership. (First Nat.T . .t 8. Bank v. IMus- I 
trial Acc. Com., 213 Cal. 822 (2 ,P.2d 347. 78 A.L;R. 1324] i 
National etc. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Com .• 29 Cal.App.2d 836 
[84 P.2d 2011 ; see Reed v. Indu.strial Ace, Com .• 10 Cal.2d 
191 [73 P.2d 1212, 114 A.L.R. 720].) The case of Ocean I 
A . .t G. Corp~ v.Industrial Acc. Com., 104 Cal.App. 34 [285 P. . 
7071 is not controlling, for it holds that where. in a workmen'a . 
compensation policy, a partnership is the tnsned and the 
partners are not covered, the dissolution of the partnership 
and ensuing employment of the retiring partner by the indi-
vidual continuing the business is not covered by the policy 
reason of aection 2557 of the Civil Code, the predecessor of 
section 304: of e nsurance • 
there created which would operate as a trap for the unwary. ! 
[2] While it is !lrue that a careful reading of the policy would : 
show that when the name of the insured was changed from &1 
partnel'fthip to that of. an individual succeeding partner, em-
ployees who were relatives of the individual insured would be 
excluded, if not specially covered as such, yet section 304 of 
the Insurance Code, supra, indicates that the lCinterest in the' 
insurance" passes when one partner buys out the others. That 
interest should embrace the character of the employees covered I 
Cornisb was justified in assuming that thE' mere change ir 
name would not limit the full protection he theretofore ha( 
) 
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and intended to have in the new poliey. Petitioner's _,!'!1'tiin 
that Haugen's knowledge was Cornish's knowledge, and 
fact that Haugen testified that he knew a poliey issued to 
individual insured did not cover relatives unless 80 8J)E!Cllile 
is not significant, for it would not necessarily follow that 
nish knew that a mere change in name of the insured __ ,_w __ 
have such effect. Haugen contacted the insurer and no 
problem was mentioned. Furthermore, the credibility of ' 
testimony was for the commission. It will be reJneJnbereJ 
that Haugen communicated with petitioner's ofticeas to 
mode of procedure when a partnership sells to one of the 
ners, but was not advised of the effect on the character of 
employees covered by the policy by the change of the 
of the insured. 
There is some analogy to the renewal eases in the ... _. __ ...... 
expressed by section 304 of the Insurance Code. [3] 
an insured requests an existing but expiring poliey to be 
newed, no change may be made in the terms of the ,..-.::.IJ,.,WADJI 
policy without notice, to the insured. (Connecticut Pire 
Co. v. OakleylmprotJed Bldg. ct L. Co., 80 F.2d 717; Uuach~"~l 
Parish Police Jury v. Northern 1m. Co. (La.App.), 176 
639.) As above seen, the policy may be interpreted to 
that a change in the name of the insured would result in 
change of the employees covered. That is not true in the 
newalcases, but here we have more. [4:] The ne1iti4)neir-ilIl1'l 
surer should have anticipated that Cornish would 
that his relatives would not be excluded by his nu:rchase[~ 
of the partnership. Haugen was the agent for the in!!,nr.~l11 
in the collection of premiums and it may be said that by 
proc,ess he became aware of the presence of Spidle's name 
the payroll, inasmuch as the premiums are based on the 
roll. He knew Spidle was a relative. The premiums 
were based on the payroll containing Spidle's name were 
to and retained by petitioner. This has BOme signifiiC&lncei';l 
even though such premium would not be enough to 
Spidle as a relative of Cornish, when we consider that Spidle 
pay should not form any part of the basis for the premium 
if the policy did not cover him at aU because of his relation-, 
ship to Cornish, and, further, that petitioner did not even'" 
deliver a policy until about three months after it was applied " 
for, and some time after Spidle's fatal accident. ' 
[5] Petitioner relies upon such cases as Westerfeld v. New' 
York Life 1m. Co., 129 Cal. 68 [58 P. 92, 61 P. 667] ; Sharman 
v. Continental 1m. Co., 167 Cal. 117 [138 P. 708,52 L.R.A.N.S. 
I 
I 
) 
I 
I 
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670] j Cayford v. Metropolitan lAfe 1m. Co., 5 Cal.A.pp. 715 
[91 P. 266], and Hargett v. (h,lf 1m. 00.,12 Cal.App.2d 449 
[55 P.2d 1258], for the proposition that knowledge of a solicit-
ing agent is not the knowledge of the iIi.surer. The extent or 
nature of the application of such a rule is not clear (aee Bank-
er's Indem.Ins. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 4 Cal.2d 89 [47 
P.2d 719] ; National Auto. ct Oal. 00. v. Industrial Ace. Oom., 
ante, p. 20 [206 P.2d 841]), but in any event it would 
not be of any significance when section 304 of the Insurance 
Code is considered. Under the circumstances of this ease, 
that section continued the coverage and rendered it effective 
at the time . the liability for compensation arose, that is, the 
Insurance Code provision preserved the coverage although one 
of the partners bought the other's interest, and the award is 
sustainable on that ground. 
The award is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., ~ncurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-8ection 304 of the Insurance Code (for-
merly Civ. Code, § 2557) provides: "In the case of partners, 
joint owners, or owners in common, who are jointly insured, 
a transfer of int.erest by one to another thereof does not avoid 
insuranc.e, even though it has been agreed that the insurance 
shall cease upon an alienation of the subject insured." 
Under this section a partnership policy of workmen'. com-
pensation insurance is continued on behalf of an individual 
expartner after dissolution of the partnership ('m NatWnal 
T. ct 8. Bank v. IndttStrial Ace. Oom., 213 Cal. 322 [2 P.2d 
347, 78 A.L.R. 1324]; NatioMl Auto. 1m. Co. v. IfKlulfrial 
Ace. Oom., 29 Cal.App.2d 336 [84 P.2d 201]) ; thus dissolution 
does not entail a forfeiture of the insurance. What is the cov-
erage of the insurance contract while it is so continued' The 
language of the code-" a transfer of interest . .• does not 
avoid (the contract of]· insurance"-leads to the conclusion 
that the insurance coverage before partnership dissolution is 
continued by section 304 at least so long as the policy does not 
expire or is not terminated by the parties. Under section 304, 
the insurance held by the partners was not avoided by the 
transfer from Schultz to Cornish of his interest in the part-
nership. To ascertain what protection continues after disso-
*Inll11rallce is cleAned 1n IOctiOD 22.lD8urance Oode, .. "a ecmuac' 
whereb7 •• I' 
I 
j 
i 
I 
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lution, one need inquire only which employees were covered by" 
the contract between the partners and the cOlllpany. All four, 
employees of the partnership, including Spidle, were covered 
by the irulurance, for the clause of the policy excluding rela: 
tives was irrelevant to that contract. :' 
In the only case dealing expressly with the coverage of ,. 
contract continued under section 304, Ocean A. cf G. Corp. ,:: 
Industrwl Ace. Com., 104 Cal.App. 34 [285 P. 7071, the con~ 
tinuation-of-partnership-contract interpretation, was adoptea' 
by the court and resulted in restriction of the insurer's ~' 
bility. The court was confronted with a dis.'iolved partnership' 
and a claim by one who was formerly a partner but only ~ 
employee of his expartner when injured. The policy issued 
to the partners, which remained unchanged after dissolution, 
of the partnership, provided that ., this policy shall not apply, 
to any member of such partnership . . • " The court held that. 
the injured expartner employee was not covered by the policy 
even after the change in the partnership. He was not covered ' 
when the contract was made, and the policy issued to the: 
partnership continued without change under section 304.' 
Spidle'S case is simply the converse situation. Since he was 
covered when the contract was made, he was covered during : 
the period of its continuance under section 304. 
The controlling question therefore is whether that policy: 
was cancelled before the injury resulting in Spidle'8 death., 
It is my opinion that the submission of the policy to the COlD-,' 
pany did not result in cancellation, for cancellation was con~" 
ditional on the continued existence of insurance protectinB 
the employer. 
Haugen telephoned the insurance company and inquired ,,' 
about the proper procedure to follow in changing the business' 
entity on the policy. He was instructed to send in the old', 
policy for cancellation and was told that a new policy would. 
then be issued, to be effective retroactively. It is unquestioned i" 
that both parties intended the employer to have the benefit 1 
of insurance during the interim the new policy was in prepara-; 
tion. Since Cornish was protected by section 304 under the 1 
original policy, cancellation would have been for the sole bene- ;! 
fit of the insurer as well as at its direction. I cannot believe ~ 
that either party contemplated cancellation apart from thej 
effective creation of a new contract of insurance. i 
After noting that contract negotiation must be judged ob- : 
jectively by the manifestationR of the parties, the diBSenting ) 
opinion relies on the legal conclusion of Haugen'8 secretary; 
~I 
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that "We cancelled Mrs. Cornish'. old insurance policy .•. " 
even though the opinion thereafter shows at length that Hau-
gen was not the company'. agent and could not cancel the 
policy. A letter from Haugen is also quoted as a manifesta-
tion of an intent to cancel. uThe letter, directed to the in-
surer, reads: cRe: #546-07595-R.C. Cornish & Schultz DBA 
Cornish & Schultz, Crane Co. 
Please cancell [Sic] policy dective 8-1-46 as there baa 
been a change of entity. • • . 
Please rewrite this policy dectil'e 8-1-46 as follows: 
B. O. Cornish, an individual, DBA R. O.Cornish 
Crane Service. . • . . 
Enclosed find check of net to col'erpayroll audit on 
B. O. Oornish from 8-1-46 to 10-1-46 ... .''' 
This letter does indicate an intent to cancel. But in addi. 
tion, it manifests the request of the cancelling party for in· 
surance that would be effective on August 1, 1946. The ob-
jective theory of contracts properly limits our inquiry to the 
manifestations by the parties of their intent, but does not 
preclude consideration of the acts and words of the principals 
in the light of their obvious purposes. In that light, it is clear 
that Cornish's consent to cancellation and Haugen's authority 
to cancel were granted on condition that a contract of insur· 
ance would be in existence at the moment the old coverage 
ceased. (K. C. Working C. Co. v. EUf'eka--8,cunty P. ff Il. 
Ins. Co., 82 Cal.App.2d 120 [185 P.2d 832] ; Poor v. Hudson 
1m. Co., 2 F. 432; Holden. v. Putnam F. Ins. Co., 46 N.Y. 1 
[7 Am.Rep. 287]; Aetna 1m. Co. v. B03en'b'f'g, 62 Ark. 507 
[36 S.W. 908].) 
There was no new contract at the time of Spidle'. death 
because there was no agreement about the extent of coverage. 
Cornish had only four employees. He never agreed or author· 
ized Haugen to agree to coverage of only half of his work 
force. The dissenting opinion states: "In the absence of 
fraud, one who accepts an instrument which on its face is a 
contract, is deemed to assent to all of its terms, and he cannot 
escape liability upon the ground that he has not read it." 
But Cornish did not receive the instrument that purported 
to represent his contract with the insurer until weeks after the 
fatal accident. The dissent also points to the original policy 
issued to the partnership. U There was ample opportunity 
for Cornish to examine the limitation in the first policy. which 
was the same standard form used in specifying the new cov-
erage. " But Cornish could not have been certain on October 
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23, 1946, that the "same standard form" used to insure the, 
partnership would be issued to him on January 17, 1947.' 
Moreover, I cannot agree that the use by an insurer of a mul-
tiple-purpose form, with clauses in the alternative for differ-
ent factual situations, can bind one formerly insured to knowl-
t!dge of all the clauses in the policy totally irrelevant to the 
contract evidenced by the policy. If Cornish knew any clause 
in the old policy, it was the one stating, in bold type, "Failure 
to secure the payment of full compensation benefits to ALL 
EMPLOYEES is a misdemeanor." Cornish paid premiums for 
four employees and never manifested consent .to be insured 
for any smaller number. 
It is difficult to ascertain what intent the insurer manifested 
concerning the issuance of a new policy. Once it is assumed 
that Haugen was not the insurer's agent, the only link to the 
insurance company is found in the telephone conversation 
that Haugen had with Mr. Furbush, presumably an agent of 
the company. No testimony of any agent capable of binding I 
the company appears in the record. Because we have only the 
fragmentary report of the conversation by Mrs. Cornish, it 
would be unreasonable to assume that the insurance company 
had done anything but consent to its customary contra~t of 
insurance with an individual, under which relatives of the 
insured are excluded. 
Since the parties never agreed on the coverage of the in-
surance, no new contract existed at the time of Spidle's death. 
The condition for cancellation was therefore not fulfilled. 
(E. C. Working O. 00. v. Eureka-Security P • .. M. Ins. Co., 
82 Cal.App.2d 120 [185 P.2d 8321; Tarleton v. DeYfJutle, 113 
F.2d 290 [32 A.L.R. 3431 (Cal.App. 9th).} Since the part-
nership policy, which covered Spidle and was continued under 
section 304, was not cancelled at the time of his death, the 
award must be affirmed. 
In affirming the award, it must be recognized that the In-
dustrial Accident Commission ordered the reformation of a 
contract to which the parties never agreed. The prohlem is 
academic, however, since the company is liable under the part-
nership policy for the amount of the award. The company 
was not prejudiced by the award of reformation hecause the 
new policy as issued on January 17, 1947, did cover the only 
8urviving employee-relative. In any event, the policy that 
the commission erroneously attempted to reform has expired. 
Spence, J " concurred. 
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EDMONDS, J.-I cannot agree that section 304 of the In-
surance Code "continued the coverage {of the policy origi.· 
nally written by the insurer] and rendered it effective at the 
time the liability for compensation arose." That policy, it 
appears without conflict, was delivered to the insurer for cm;. 
cellation before the accident to Spidle occurred. The evidence 
also shows the acceptance by the insurer of coverage to reo 
place that of the cancelled policy, the new insurance being 
written as ordered by the agent of the insured. 
According to the majority opinion, "Haugen was an insur· 
ance broker who procured the partnership policy for the part-
nership. While in such capacity he was the agent for the 
partnership, and later, for Cornish in connection with the pro-
curement of the insurance." Schultz sold his interest in the 
business to Cornish in July and the partnership was dissolved 
on August 1st. Evidently nothing was done about the insur· 
ance until October when Mrs. Cornish and Haugen discussed 
the policy which was then in effect. He telephoned Furbush 
of the insurance company for instructions. Furbush stated 
that it would be necessary to cancel the old policy and write 
anew one. 
The telephone call was made in Mrs. Cornish's presence, 
and she left the policy written for the partnership with Haugen 
for cancellation. Anne Kodak, secretary to Haugen, testified 
that "We cancelled Mrs. Cornish's old insurance policy . • • 
and I mailed in the old policy with the check for the new pre-
mium and payroll report at that time." 
A letter identified as having been written by Haugen im· 
mediately after the interview with Mrs. Cornish fully cor· 
roborates the t~timony as to the cancellation of the partner-
ship policy. The letter, directed to the insurer, reads: 
"Re: #546·07595·R.C. Cornish & Schultz DBA Cornish & 
Schultz, Crane Co. 
Please cancel policy effective 8·1-46 as there has been 
a change of entity .... and .•• rewrite this policy 
effective 8-1-46 as follows: 
R. C. Cornish, an individual, DBA R. C. Cornish 
Crane Service. . . . 
Enclosed find check of net to cover payroll audit on 
R. C. Cornish from 8·1-46 to 10·1-46 .... " . 
Unquestionably the insurer accepted these instructions from 
Haugen and changed its coverage accordingly. As stated in 
the majority opinion, "presumably [the original policy] was 
612 INDUSTRIAL INDEX. 00. tI. IND. Aoo. 00)(. 
cancelled. " Although the new policy reached Haugen 
Spidle was killed, nevertheless there is evidence that it . 
issued prior to the accident and had been mailed to Haugen,' 
i Mrs. Cornish, as the agent for her husband, manifested her 
consent to the terms of the new policy by authorizing HaugeD,' 
to request the insurer to cancel the then existing insurance 
and rewrite the policy effective as of August 1st in the name 
of R. C. Cornish, an individual, doing business as R. C. Cor·· 
nish Crane Service. She was present during Haugen's tel~ 
phone conversation with the insurer, and made no objecti _. 
to having the new insurance issued to her husband u an inc1i' 
vidual. 
Her state of mind is immaterial (Zurich "c. Auur.Oo. 'f,'j-
Indu3friol Ace. Oom., 132 Cal.App. 1.01, 104 [22 P.2d 572])1 .. ' 
Objectively, both the insured and thil insurer manifested co~ 
sent to the issuance of the new policy. The insured cannot be", 
excused upon the ground that the terms of the policy were,,%) 
not read. There was ample opportunity for Cornish to ex~ I 
amine the limitation in the first policy, which was the same1 
standard form used in specifying the new coverage. In the.' 
absence of fraud, one who accepts an instrument which on its .... 
face is a contract, is deemed to assent to all of its terms, and -.• 
he cannot escape liability upon the ground that he has not 1" 
read it (Gretle v. Taft Realty 00., 101 Cal.App. 343, 352 
[281P. 641]). There would be no point whatsoever in stating . 
the terms of an insurance policy. if its conditions and limita- :: 
tion may be vitiated, as suggested in the majority opinion, by .~ 
the insured's inquiry: "Are we fully covered'" If that I 
were the law, an affirmative answer to such a question might-
subject the insurer to liability for fire, theft, burglary or other ;i 
hazards in • policy the terms of which included no such cover- j 
age. " 
Although the majority opinion does not expressly state'1 
that Haugen was the agent of the insurer with general powers I 
and to such an extent as to make his knowledge imputable tos 
the company, the decision is impliedly placed upon that :j 
ground. As a basis for affirming the award it is said: "There ~ 
is evidence from which it may be inferred that he was peti •. 
tioner's agent lor the coIJeetion of premiums on policies in ... : 
much as the invoices or bills for premiums from petitioner .~ 
. stated that Cornish should pay the premiums to 'your agent '.~ 
Haugen." But until this time it would seem to have been 1 
settled that an agent for collection of premiums is not an .~ 
agent for coverage or other purposes. (Detroit T. 00. 'f. { 
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Transcontinental Ins. Co., 105 Cal.App. 395 [287 P. 535]; 
Parrish v. Rosebud M. ~ M. Co., 140 Cal. 635 [74 P. 312] ; 
Bennett v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 84 Cal.App. 130 [257 P. 
586].) It is a general rule, apart from controlling factual 
variations, that an insurance broker is the agent of the in-
sured "for the purpose of procuring the policy and the in-
surer only in order to receive and transmit the premiums." 
(Overland Sales Co. v. American lndem. Co. (Tex.Civ.App.), 
256 S.W. 980, 982; 16 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 
[1944] § 8725.) "It is also the general rule tIl.t the knowl-
edge of a broker as to facts or matters pertaining to the risk, 
while imputable to the insured, is not imputabZe 10 the in-
surer." (16 Appleman, supra, § 8730, p. 163; Ben Franklin 
Ins. Co. v. Weary, 4 Ill.App. 74; Reser v. Southern Kans. Mut. 
Ins. Co., 150 Kan. 58 [91 P.2d 25, 28]; BoneweZZ v. NOrth 
American Ace. Ins. Co., 167 Mich. 274 [132 N.W. 1067, Ann. 
Cas. 1913A 847]; Fire Assn. of Pua v. American Cement 
Plaster Co., 37 Tex.Civ.App. 629 [84 S.W. 1115].) Haugen 
was not an agent of the insurer; he was a broker, and his inci-
dental function of collecting the premiums upon insurance 
procured by him was not sufficient to charge the insurer with 
his knowledge for any purpose whatever. Everything which 
he did in connection with the cancellation of the partnership 
policy and the procurement of the second policy was in his 
capacity as the agent of Cornish. I 
Under these circumstances there is no factual basis what-
ever for affirming the award upon the ground that section 304 
of the Insurance Code governs the rights of the parties. 
The statute is inapplicable where, as here, the iuitial insur- I 
ance policy is replaced by a subsequent one. The background I 
and basic purpose of the code section clearly demonstrate that 
it was never intended to continue an insurance agreement in 
effect when the original coverage is replaced by a subsequent 
contract. 
A basic rule in the insurance field is that an insurance con-
tract is ". . . considered to be personalized in its risks, 
involving the moral hazard of possible destruction by the 
insured, risks of carelessness or neglect, and the courts are 
reluctant to require the companies to assume dangers not con-
templated, and to require them to protect persons with whom 
no contract was ever made. Being such a personal contract, it 
is avoided by a sale of the insured property." (4 Appleman, 
M C.Id-U 
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Insurance Law and Practice lHJ41j, § 2741, p .. 629, citing 
Lyford v. Connecticl£t Fire Ins. Co., .99 :\Ie. 273 [58 A. 916] 
alll) Llllison v. Nat'ional Union F,:re Ins. Co., 163 Tenn. 246 
~43 S.W.2d 202].) However, the rule has been qualified to 
the extent that". . . where a change in title is merely nomi-
nal; and not such as would increase a motive to burn the 
property or to decrease safeguards surrounding it, the provi-
sion [rendering the policy void is] ... not ... violated." 
(4 Appleman, supra, at p. 632, citing Forward v. Continental 
Ins. Co., 142 N.Y. 382 [37 N.E. 615].) Thus, although public 
policy in general favors the absolute avoidance of insurance 
when the· property is alienated, the courts have refused to 
apply the rule when the alienation is nominal or essentially so, 
as in the case of a conveyance from one partner to another, 
or in the case of dissolution of partnership. 
Section 304 reads: "Transfer by partner. In the case of 
partners, joint owners, or owners in common, who are jointly 
insured, a transfer of interest by one to another thereof does 
not avoid insurance, even though it has been agreed that the 
insurance shall cease upon an alienation of the subJect in-
sured. " By another statute, insurance is defined as ". . . . a 
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify another against 
loss. damage, or liability arising from a contingent or unknown 
event." (Ins. Code, § 22.) Applying this definition to sec-
tion 304, it reads: "In the case of partners . . . who are 
jointly insured, a transfer of intercst by onc to another thereof 
does not avoid [the contract of] insurance, even though it has 
been agreed that the [contract undertaking the indemnifica-
tion] . . . shall cease upon an alienation of the subject in-
sured." Its principal purpose is to prevent the avoidance 
of insurance upon alienation of the subject matter in the case 
of dissolution of a partnership. The section was not intended 
to abolish the familiar contract rule that a contract is rendered 
ineffective by mutual consent when it is replaced by a subse-
quent contract dealing with the same subject matter and con-
taining terms inconsistent with those of the original agree-
ment. The new policy expressly excluded Spidle from its 
coverage by providing: "If this policy is issued to an indi-
vidual ... it is agreed that; anything in this policy to the 
contrary notwithstanding, this policy does not insure: As 
respects injuries (or death resulting therefrom) sustained by 
any of the following relatives of the employer, i. e., ... son-
in-law ... unless such relative is specifically named in item 
(III) of the Declarations or specifically insured by Endorse-
---_.--------------------------
ment attached to this policy." Spidle was not named in iteJll 5' 5 
(III) nor was he included in the coverage by endorsement. 
For these reasons, in my opinion, the award should be an-
nulled. 
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied Decem-
ber 29, 1949. Edmonds, J., voted for a rehearing. 
